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Supply and Demand, One and the Same Since
When?: The EPA’s Failed Attempt to Find a
Loophole in the Renewable Fuel Standard
“We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if
humanity is to survive.”1
INTRODUCTION
Since Congress’s promulgation of the Clean Air Act in 1963,2 the
United States government has attempted to focus domestic consumers on
reducing the amount of pollution they contribute to the environment.
Moreover, in two amendments to the Clean Air Act—one in 2005 and
another in 2007—Congress promulgated and expanded the Renewable
Fuel Standard (RFS) program, authorizing the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to mandate an annually
increasing production of renewable fuels.3 As consumers use what is
provided, the production and availability of fuels that generate less carbon
dioxide when burned is critical to the overall goal of reducing pollution.
The consumption of renewable fuels reduces carbon dioxide emissions,
which slows the rise of global temperatures.4 Thus, the closer producers
get to yielding a transportation fuel composed of 100% renewable fuel, the
closer consumers will be to achieving the goal of the Clean Air Act and
RFS—reducing pollution.
Though the RFS appears theoretically sound, its implementation has
proven difficult. Until 2013, the problem rested with renewable fuel
producers, who were unable to generate the mandated supply. Today’s
problem, however, lies with the retailers and advertisers. Fuel retailers,
commanded by large oil companies that have dominated the fuel market
for decades, claim that practical and infrastructural constraints, known as

Copyright 2017, by KOURTNEY LANEA KECH
1. Robert Shogan, Mankind’s Challenge: Living with Terror: The Bomb is 40,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1985, articles.latimes.com/1985-08-04/news/mn-4275_1_atomic
-bomb [https://perma.cc/VV3K-EP9Z] (quoting Albert Einstein).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–661 (2015).
3. Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.); Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–40, §§ 201–04, 121 Stat.
1492 (2007).
4. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Carbon
Dioxide Emissions, epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma
.cc/M67G-VPSX] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
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the “blendwall,” deem the RFS required amounts unattainable.5 The EPA
appears sympathetic to this notion, and as a result, it has lowered the
statutory volumes of renewable fuel to meet consumption and distribution
constraints.6 However, it is unclear whether the EPA has the power to do
so. The EPA’s recent actions, especially those since 2013, have
undermined the goals and requirements of the RFS, undercut investment
in advanced biofuels, and raised greenhouse gas emissions in the
transportation fuel sector.7 Renewable fuels required to be used by the RFS
statute “reduce emissions of greenhouse gases compared to fossil fuels,”
so the EPA’s reduction in renewable fuel volumes subject to the RFS has
a direct and damaging impact on greenhouse gas emissions goals.8
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief overview of renewable
fuels, noting key differences in the nature and uses of first-generation
biofuels. Part II addresses the history and recent popularization of ethanol,
a first-generation biofuel that provides a fuel source arguably more ecofriendly than more traditional sources such as petroleum. Part III describes
the RFS, tracing its evolution from its origins in 2005 to the current law in
effect. It will also discuss the relevant statutory provisions that the EPA
relied on when reducing the statutory volumes of renewable fuel for 2014–
2016. Part IV provides an overview of the EPA’s interpretation of its
statutory authority and claim that it has the power to consider the
blendwall constraints when determining whether there is an “inadequate
domestic supply” of renewable fuels. Finally, Part V of this Comment
provides the framework for judicial review of agency interpretations of
statutes and will include an analysis, using two landmark cases involving
agency interpretation, to determine whether the EPA has overstepped the
constitutional bounds of its authority with its broad interpretation of the
RFS waiver provision.

5. See Marc J. Rauch, Big Oil’s Anti-E15 Campaign Filled with Gross
Exaggerations and Misinformation, AUTO CHANNEL (May 16, 2012), theautochannel
.com/news/2012/05/16/036507-big-oil-s-anti-e15-campaign-filed-with-grossexaggerations.html [https://perma.cc/MU9E-S4VA].
6. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the BiomassBased Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420 (Dec. 14, 2015).
7. Letter from Brent Erickson, Exec. Vice President, Biotechnology Indus.
Org., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA, 1–2 (July 27, 2015), bio.org/sites/default/files
/EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0111%20-%20BIO%202014-2016%20RFS%20Comments
%20-%202015-07-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2C-XJU9] (referencing Docket No.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0111).
8. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Modifications to Renewable
Fuel Standard Program, 78. Fed. Reg. 62462, 62465 (Oct. 22, 2013); see also id. at
62468 (noting that Clean Air Aft section 211(o) “requires all renewable fuels used in
the RFS program . . . to meet specified thresholds for reductions in lifecycle
greenhouse gas emissions compared to a baseline fossil fuel”).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF BIOFUELS
As the RFS contains vocabulary new to those unfamiliar with
scientific study, it is important to define key terms detailed in the
legislation before discussing its ramifications. Thus, familiarization with
biofuel—the topic Congress attempts to legislatively control in the RFS—
will create the foundation necessary to understand the potential conflicts
that the current statutory language permits.
While the U.S. has historically relied on petroleum to satisfy the
majority of its energy needs, the consequences of that reliance have proven
grave. Among other things, the exploration for and production of
petroleum releases dangerous toxins into the atmosphere, contributes to
greenhouse gas emissions, and often involves consequential oil spills,
which cause great environmental damage.9 In an effort to reduce U.S.
reliance on such an environmentally unfriendly resource, car
manufacturers and utility companies have been in serious pursuit of
alternative energy sources. Among the leading contenders are biofuels—
the renewable, clean burning fuels that Congress addresses in the RFS.
“Biofuel” denotes any fuel produced from renewable biomass, which
includes plants, woody materials, and organic wastes.10 Plants take in
carbon dioxide as they grow and, theoretically, emit the same amount of
carbon dioxide when burned as fuel.11 While some observers consider
biofuels to be “carbon neutral,”12 others argue that the use of fossil fuels
needed to produce the sources of biofuel effectively create higher carbon
dioxide emissions than can be balanced out by the burning of those
biofuels.13 Nevertheless, they contribute far less carbon than the
production of petroleum. Transportation biofuels, which are those used in
motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, non-road vehicles, or non-road
engines (except for ocean-going vessels),14 are commonly classified as
first-, second-, or third-generation biofuels.15 The different generation
9. See generally Wout Broekema, Crisis-Induced Learning and Issue
Politicization in the EU: The Braer, Sea Empress, Erika, and Prestige Oil Spill
Disasters, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: SYMPOSIUM: DESIGNING RESILIENT
INSTITUTIONS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT 381 (Arjen Boin &
Martin Lodge ed., 2016).
10. Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard
Eventually End Corn Ethanol’s Reign?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 667 (2010). The
biofuel definition explicitly excludes fossil fuels.
11. Cymie Payne, Local Meets Global: The Low Carbon Fuel Standard and
the WTO, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG 891, 895 (2009).
12. Powers, supra note 10, at 669.
13. See id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (o)(1)(L) (2015).
15. See Powers, supra note 10, at 667.
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designations depend on the sources used to derive these fuels, their current
or future commercial availability, their overall energy efficiency, and the
potential side effects of their production and use.16
A. First-Generation Biofuels
Although the definition of first-generation biofuel is not scientifically
established, the term generally refers to biofuels that are currently
produced on a commercial scale.17 As first-generation biofuels are
extracted from plants that typically serve as crops or feedstocks,18 they can
be derived using relatively simple technology and can be produced in
massive quantities at a lower production cost.19 Ethanol and biodiesel—
both serving as replacements for transportation fuel—are the two main
categories of first-generation biofuel.20 This Comment will focus solely on
ethanol because the EPA has chosen to waive the total renewable fuel
requirement, which has historically been composed of ethanol.
B. Second- and Third-Generation Biofuels
Second-generation biofuels are those that are close to approaching
commercial scale production status and include fuels produced from nonfood, cellulosic materials rather than from feedstocks.21 It is more difficult
to mass-produce these biofuels due to challenges in releasing the sugars
from these materials necessary to convert them to ethanol.22
Third-generation biofuels include several experimental alcohols
developed from crops and the promising—and proven—technology of
algae-based biodiesels (oilgae).23 These biofuels are not yet available due
to lack of production experience—algae growth requires extensive
amounts of water, nitrogen, and phosphorous that makes it more costly to
produce.24 Large-scale oilgae production is unlikely to occur in the near

16. Id.
17. Timothy A. Slating & Jay P. Kesan, The Renewable Fuel Standard 3.0?
Moving Forward With the Federal Biofuel Mandate, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 374, 386
(2014).
18. Id. at 388.
19. Id.
20. Powers, supra note 10, at 675.
21. Anselm Eisentraut, Sustainable Production of Second-Generation Biofuels:
Potential and Perspectives in Major Economies and Developing Countries, INT’L
ENERGY AGENCY 1, 80 (2010).
22. Id.
23. Powers, supra note 10, at 676.
24. Id.

2017]

SUPPLY AND DEMAND, ONE AND THE SAME SINCE WHEN?

401

future because companies with enough capital to invest in the process are
hesitant to face the high production costs.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHANOL
The vast majority of ethanol, or ethyl alcohol, is derived from starch- and
sugar-based feedstocks.25 The use of these food materials, easy to extract and
ferment, makes large-scale ethanol production affordable.26 Corn serves as the
feedstock for most domestic ethanol production and is currently the leading
crop in the U.S. As concerns surrounding corn’s availability for human and
livestock have risen, the RFS has limited the amount of starch-based ethanol
permitted to satisfy the statutory volume of 15 billion gallons.27 This
limitation is in place to ensure that enough corn remains to meet demand in
livestock feed, human food, and export markets.28
A. Background and History
Despite ethanol’s recent popularization, it is not a new engine fuel. It
has been used since the 1820s, when Samuel Morey introduced its use in
his first internal combustion engine prototype.29 Ethanol fuel then received
little attention until 1860, when Nicholas Otto began experimenting with
internal combustion engines.30 Later, in 1896, Henry Ford designed his
first car, the “Quadricycle,” to run on pure ethanol.31 In 1908, Ford’s
revolutionary “Model T” was capable of running on gasoline, ethanol, or
a combination of both.32 While Ford continued to advocate for ethanol fuel
during the prohibition movement, lower prices caused gasoline to prevail.
25. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Alternative Fuels Data Center: Ethanol Production
and Distribution, afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_production.html [https://perma.cc
/LR3A-3FHE] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Alternative Fuels Data Center: Ethanol Feedstocks,
afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_feedstocks.html [https://perma.cc/8PDT-F3WH] (last
visited Apr. 9, 2017).
27. Id.
28. See Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,466–67 (Dec. 14,
2015); Brent D. Yacobucci, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42824, ANALYSIS OF
RENEWABLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS (RINS) IN THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD
(RFS) 1 (2013).
29. See HORST O. HARDENBERG, SAMUEL MOREY AND HIS ATMOSPHERIC
ENGINE (1992). His discovery was overlooked, mostly due to the success of steam
power at the time.
30. See LYLE CUMMINS, INTERNAL FIRE: THE INTERNAL COMBUSTION
ENGINE 1673–1900 (1989).
31. See Henry Ford, H ISTORY.COM, history.com/topics/henry-ford [https:
//perma.cc/QF39-7MS8] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
32. Id.
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In the late 1970s, the U.S. saw long-term growth in gasoline containing
up to 10% ethanol (E10).33 The discovery that methyl tertiary butyl ether
(MTBE) was contaminating groundwater spurred the demand for ethanol
produced from field corn, thus opening a new market for ethanol.34
The steep growth in twenty-first century ethanol use was driven by
federal legislation aimed to reduce oil use and enhance energy security. As
discussed below, Congress sought, through promulgation of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 (EISA), and the RFS arising from each, to significantly reduce
reliance on foreign fuel sources and to reduce greenhouse gases.
B. Ethanol’s Rise in Popularity
As rule makers promulgated legislation to counter the negative
environmental impacts of diesel gasoline, biofuels, including ethanol,
grew increasingly popular. More than 97% of today’s biofuel comes in the
form of ethanol.35 Ethanol-blended fuel is typically E10 (90% gasoline,
10% ethanol), which is the blend approved for use by every major
automaker in the world.36 Today, nearly all of the approximately 139
billion gallons of gasoline used for transportation purposes contains 10%
ethanol.37 To illustrate, when consumers go to gas stations to fill up their
tanks, they can normally look on the pump and find a sign containing
language similar to “contains 10% ethanol.” This sign effectively alerts
the consumer that he or she will be putting E10 gasoline into the vehicle.
In addition to E10, the EPA works with auto manufacturers to qualify
cars for higher blend levels—most notably, E15 (contains 15% ethanol)
and E85 (contains 85% ethanol). While E85 contains the least amount of
diesel fuel (15%), the only vehicles able to efficiently burn this fuel are
flex-fuel vehicles, which have not gained enough popularity to dominate
the automobile market.38 In addition, though some car models from 2001
and later have been approved for E15, the warranties of many automakers

33. Jeffrey Goettemoeller & Adrian Goettemoeller, SUSTAINABLE ETHANOL:
BIOFUELS, BIOREFINERIES, CELLULOSIC BIOMASS, FLEX-FUEL VEHICLES, AND
SUSTAINABLE FARMING FOR ENERGY INDEPENDENCE 42 (2007).
34. Id.
35. RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, POCKET GUIDE TO ETHANOL 2015, 1, 2
(2015). As discussed above, corn-based ethanol is considered a first-generation
biofuel. As such, ethanol is a biodegradable, high-octane motor fuel derived from
the sugars, starches, and cellulosic matter found in plants.
36. Rauch, supra note 5, at 1.
37. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the BiomassBased Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,421 (Dec. 14, 2015).
38. Id. at 77,438.
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do not cover the use of E15 fuel.39 As a result, the fuel market is dominated
by E0 (100% gasoline) and E10.40
III. THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD
In the mid-2000s, growing concerns over energy security, greenhouse
gas emissions, and steep oil prices combined to reinvigorate consumer,
governmental, and commercial support for new biofuels.41 To address
these concerns, Congress promulgated the RFS, a statutory mandate that
requires domestic transportation fuel to contain a specified, minimum
volume of biofuel.42 The RFS has played a dominant role in the continued
development of the United States biofuel sector; however, the standards
that the EPA released for 2014 through 2016 reflect a novel and
questionable interpretation of the statutory language. This Comment
presents the evolution of the original RFS to the law in effect today and
highlights sections on which the legislative authority relied when setting
the 2014–2016 standards.
A. Evolution of the Renewable Fuel Standard
In order to ascertain the legislature’s intent when enacting law, it is
imperative to understand the circumstances under which the law was
created. This Comment thus provides a brief description of RFS1, the prior
version of the RFS, and RFS2, the current law in effect.
1. Origins and RFS1
Congress passed the EPAct in response to increasing national demand
for transportation fuel, declining domestic production of refined petroleum
products, and rising environmental concerns associated with rapid and
negative climate change.43 As part of a larger program to encourage
development of renewable fuels, the EPAct amended the fuel provisions
of the Clean Air Act44 to establish the RFS, set forth at section 211o of the

39. Rauch, supra note 5, at 1.
40. Michael Romita, The Renewable Fuel Program at an Inflection Point:
Policy Implication of EPA’s Proposed 2014-2016 Renewable Fuel Standard, 45
ENVTL. L. 10674, 10674 (2015).
41. Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1224, 119 Stat.
594, 954 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26
U.S.C.).
42. Id.
43. Romita, supra note 40, at 10675.
44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2009).
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Clean Air Act.45 The original RFS, commonly known as RFS1, authorized
the EPA to establish a comprehensive program to replace traditional diesel
gasoline with increasing annual volumes of renewable fuel.46
Under RFS1, Congress required the EPA to determine and publish
annual percentage standards for each compliance year.47 Obligated
parties—generally producers and importers of gasoline and diesel fuel—
were to use these percentage standards to calculate their individual
compliance obligations.48 There are four percentage standards, each of
which is applied to the volume of non-renewable gasoline and diesel
produced or imported by each obligated party during a given year.49 The
application of the percentage standard serves to determine the individual
volume obligation with respect to each of the renewable fuel types—
advanced biofuel, biomass-based diesel, cellulosic biofuel, and
conventional biofuel.50 Renewable Identification Numbers (RINS) are
assigned by renewable fuel producers to each gallon of qualifying
renewable fuel and serve as a means for demonstrating compliance by
obligated parties.51 Aside from using sufficient current-year RINS to
demonstrate compliance in a given year, obligated parties may also choose
one of two options: to use available RINS from the prior year towards the
current year’s requirement, for up to a 20% cap, or to carry forward a
deficit into the next compliance year.52
Prior to promulgation of RFS1, the U.S. had produced a total of only
3.9 billion gallons of ethanol.53 The high production cost of advanced
ethanol appeared to thwart further production; thus, absent government
interjection, fuel ethanol production was projected to plateau. To
overcome production barriers, RFS1 mandated an increased use of
renewable fuel to 4.0 billion gallons in 2006, increasing yearly production
to 7.5 billions in 2012.54
2. The Current Law–RFS2
In the wake of rising oil prices, Congress promulgated EISA as a
comprehensive bill designed to increase energy efficiency and the
45. Id. § 7545(o).
46. Id.
47. See id. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i).
48. Id. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(ii).
49. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i).
50. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
51. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii).
52. Id. § 7545(o)(2).
53. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, §§
201–04, 121 Stat. 1492, 1519-30 (2007).
54. See § 7545(o)(2)(B).
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availability of renewable energy.55 Known as RFS2, this act significantly
expanded RFS1, extending by ten years the compliance period in which
Congress specified the required volume of renewable fuels—now through
2022.56 Congress also increased the yearly-required volumes57 and added
new, categorized mandates to begin in 2009.58 The categorized mandates,
nested within the total renewable fuel mandate, were separated into four
types: cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, advanced biofuel, and total
(conventional) renewable fuel.59
B. Key RFS Provisions—Waivers
RFS2 places three waiver provisions at the EPA’s disposal: a
cellulosic biofuel waiver, a biomass-based diesel waiver, and a general
waiver.60 The legislation dictates that if a waiver is issued in favor of a
producer, it automatically expires after one year unless extended by the
EPA Administrator.61
1. The Cellulosic Biofuel Waiver
The EPA must annually determine the projected volume of cellulosic
biofuel production for the following year.62 If the projected volume is less than
the applicable volume set forth by Congress in § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(III), the
EPA must lower the applicable value using the cellulosic waiver.63
If the EPA lowers the applicable volume of cellulosic biofuel, it then
has the authority to reduce the applicable volumes of both advanced
biofuel and total renewable fuel by the same or lesser amount.64 There is
no requirement that the EPA reduce these quotas, nor does the statute
mandate any factors the EPA must consider in its determination to lower
or to maintain these amounts.65 Thus, the EPA thus enjoys broad discretion in
whether, and under what circumstances, it reduces the advanced and total
renewable fuel volumes under the cellulosic biofuel waiver provision.66
55. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, §§ 201–04.
56. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i).
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I)–(IV).
60. See id. § 7545(o)(7)(D)–(F).
61. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(C).
62. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the BiomassBased Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,433–434 (Dec. 14, 2015).
66. See id. at 77,434.
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2. General Waiver
If the EPA finds that reduction of the advanced biofuel and total
renewable fuel permitted under its cellulosic waiver authority is
insufficient to address supply limitations, it can then use its general waiver
authority to effectuate a further reduction—one beyond that allowed by
the cellulosic waiver.67
Section 211(o)(7) of the Clean Air Act grants the EPA Administrator
authority to waive, in whole or in part, the national renewable fuel
requirements if one of two situations occurs. First, the EPA Administrator,
in consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy, may lower
or waive the statutory amount if the Administrator determines that
implementation of the requirement would severely harm the economy or
environment of a state, region, or the U.S.68 In addition, the EPA
Administrator may waive or reduce the statutory requirements if there is
an existing inadequate domestic supply.69 On the petition of a state, fuel
provider, or at the Administrator’s own discretion (in consultation with the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy), the EPA Administrator may grant
a waiver or reduction for a single year.70 The EPA may not waive the
requirement for an individual state or supplier, but must instead adjust the
total national requirement.71 Thus, in the event of a waiver, all suppliers’
quotas would be reduced by the same percentage.
The EPA must also approve or deny a waiver petition within ninety
days of its receipt, after providing public notice and opportunity for
comment.72 A granted waiver expires after one year, subject to extension
by the EPA Administrator in consultation with the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Energy.73
IV. EPA WAIVER OF THE 2014–2016 STANDARDS—THE CRUX OF THE
PROBLEM
For the first time since Congress promulgated the RFS, the EPA
utilized both the cellulosic and general waiver provisions to significantly
reduce the statutory volumes for 2014–2016.74 While the EPA’s use of its
67. Id.
68. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(i).
69. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(ii).
70. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(C).
71. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A).
72. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A)–(B).
73. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(C).
74. See generally Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016
and the Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,435
(Dec. 14, 2015).
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cellulosic waiver came as no surprise, its use of its general waiver
authority is one of the most controversial aspects of its Final Rule.75 The
EPA argued that there is an “inadequate domestic supply” of renewable
fuel for 2014–2016 to justify its substantial reduction of the statutory
volumes; however, its broad interpretation of the statutory phrase
inadequate domestic supply allowed it to consider a vast array of factors,
including those which seemingly pertain to inadequate demand for—
rather than inadequate supply of—renewable fuel.76
A. Statutory Volumes Waived or Reduced by the EPA
The EPA, for the first time and upon its own motion, proposed to
lower the 2014 overall RFS mandate from 18.15 billion gallons to 15.21
billion, and the advanced biofuel mandate from 3.75 billion gallons to 2.20
billion.77 After evaluating the availability of qualifying renewable fuels
and factors,78 that in some cases limit supplying those fuels to the vehicles
that can consume them, the EPA proposed to reduce the volumes of
advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel due to an “inadequate domestic
supply of these fuels.”79
The EPA published in the Federal Register its final volumes for
cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel (biodiesel), advanced biofuel, and
total renewable fuel for 2014, 2015, and 2016, on December 14, 2015.80
In its Final Rule, the EPA raised the volumes of all fuel categories above
those in the proposed rule; however, the finalized volumes remain far
below the statutory levels.81 For 2014, where actual volumes supplied to
the market were known, the final volumes do not differ significantly from
those proposed. This resulted in final volumes nearly 2 billion gallons
below the 2014 statutory requirement for total renewable fuels.82 For 2015,
where it had more than nine months of data on actual production, the EPA
75. Jonathan Coppess, Evaluating EPA’s Arguments for RFS Waiver Authority,
4 FARMDOC DAILY 7 (Jan. 16, 2014), farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2014/01/evaluatingepa-arguments-RFS-waiver-authority.html [https://perma.cc/PYK2-NLSG].
76. See id.
77. 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,424 (stating the original 2014 volume mandates); U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA PROPOSES 2014 RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARDS, 2015
BIOMASS-BASED DIESEL VOLUME 2 (Nov. 2013), epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015
-08/documents/420f13048.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9SB-DP5N] (stating the proposed
reduced 2014 volume mandates).
78. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,431. These considerations include both the limitations
in production and import of biofuels and factors that constrain supplying available
volumes specified.
79. Id. at 77,435.
80. See generally 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420.
81. Id. at 77,440.
82. Id.
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raised—but only slightly—the final volumes for nearly all of the fuel
categories.83 The final 2015 amounts reflect both actual supply and an
extrapolation from those amounts for the remaining months of the year,
resulting in moderate growth from the 2014 volumes.84 Though growth
occurred, the finalized 2015 volumes remained well below the 2015
statutory requirements.
For 2016, the EPA substantially increased its final volumes for total
renewable fuel, and slightly increased its volumes for the other fuel
categories. While the final volume for total renewable fuel is still far below
the statutory volume, the EPA’s adjustment reflects a significant increase
from both the proposed and final 2015 volumes. The EPA notes that the
increase between the 2016 and 2015 volumes is “as ambitious as can
reasonably be justified”85 and reflects the EPA’s “best judgment”86 as to
the domestic supply of renewable fuels.
B. Factors the EPA Considered when Reducing Statutory Volumes
First, the EPA utilized its cellulosic waiver to reduce the volumes of
advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel to address the shortfall in actual
produced cellulosic biofuel compared to statutory levels. The EPA then
combined the cellulosic waiver with its general waiver to establish its final
volume for total renewable fuel, effectively augmenting the cellulosic
waiver with its finding of inadequate domestic supply of ethanol and
advanced biofuels to meet statutory volumes. While the EPA made its
determination by estimating the volumes of cellulosic, biodiesel, and
advanced biofuels that might actually be available in late 2015 and 2016,
it also considered the blendwall.87 Thus, it concluded that limitations on
transportation fuel and constraints on the market’s ability to absorb more
ethanol in the fuel blend constituted relevant factors in determining
whether there is an “inadequate domestic supply” of renewable fuel.
The two major industries affected by the U.S. fuel market—biofuel
and oil—have and continue to debate the definition of inadequate
domestic supply, a phrase that arguably appears to leave room for much
interpretation. To biofuel proponents, the phrase is clear: it is the volume

83. Id. at 77,447–448.
84. Id. at 77,442.
85. Id. at 77,427.
86. Id. at 77,449.
87. Id. at 77,433. The ‘‘E10 blendwall’’ represents the volume of ethanol that can
be consumed domestically if all gasoline contains 10% ethanol and there are no
higher-level ethanol blends consumed such as E15 or E85.
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of renewable fuel that can be produced or imported.88 Further, ethanol is
abundant at the moment due to falling feedstock (corn) prices and a record
harvest, spurring production.89 Bob Dineen, the president of the
Renewable Fuels Association and lobbyist for major ethanol producers,
stated that “inadequate domestic supply of—and this is important—of
renewable fuel . . . and we’re swimming in renewable fuel. Inadequate
domestic supply is not the issue.”90
In stark contrast, the oil industry deems inadequate domestic supply
to represent the volume of biofuel-blended gasoline that can be physically
sold in the U.S.91 Oil proponents argue that the country lacks the consumer
demand and physical infrastructure to sell gasoline blended with more than
10% ethanol, for reasons that will be discussed below. The EPA appears
sympathetic to this argument, providing in its final standards that the
ethanol blendwall is an important reality.92 The EPA further reasons that
constraints on distribution and consumption of ethanol-blended fuels
equate to inadequate domestic supply that triggers its general waiver
authority. It provides that “[an] adequacy of supply would logically be
understood in terms of the parties who use the supply of renewable fuel”
and should “involve consideration of factors different from those involved
when considering adequacy of supply to obligated parties.”93 It concludes
that the concept of supply should “encompass the full range of constraints
that could result in an inadequate supply of renewable fuel to the ultimate
consumers, including fuel infrastructure and other constraints” such as
“factors affecting the ability to distribute, blend, dispense, and consume
those renewable fuels in vehicles.”94
While the EPA and the oil industry claim that this interpretation is
plausible, critics argue that, in the event that there is actually an inadequate
domestic supply of renewable fuel, it is the result of oil companies’
decisions to short the market by not providing enough gasoline or diesel.95
As the final standards include the use of the EPA’s general waiver
authority for the first time, the EPA’s interpretation of its administrative
power will be at the heart of upcoming litigation. Disputes will arise
pertaining to the legality of the EPA’s interpretation of inadequate
88. Cezary Podkul, Analysis: Brewing U.S. Ethanol Legal Battle Hinges on
the Meaning of ‘Supply,’ REUTERS, Oct. 17, 2013, reuters.com/article/us-ethanolsupply-analysis-idUSBRE99H02N20131018 [https://perma.cc/X428-U6PP].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,423.
93. Id. at 77,436.
94. Id. at 77,435.
95. Podkul, supra note 88.
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domestic supply, and the courts will be faced with determining the scope
of the EPA’s administrative and interpretive authority.
V. EPA INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT
Agencies, like the EPA, operate pursuant to statutes that empower
them to act in some sphere. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
governs the feasibility of final “agency action,” which is defined to include
the whole or part of an agency rule or order.96 The EPA’s finalized
standards for 2014–2016, and thus the interpretation of its general waiver
authority, constitute final agency action. This subjects the EPA to the
APA’s codified standards. The APA establishes a standard of review that
courts are to employ when analyzing the legitimacy of agency action.97
In the present case, the issue is whether the EPA’s discharge of its
authority—its broad interpretation of its general waiver authority to
provide for consideration of the blendwall constraints—is reasonable.
Such a question falls within the province of traditional arbitrary and
capricious review under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In reviewing the EPA’s
interpretation, the task is to determine whether the agency rationally
considered factors to define inadequate domestic supply.98
The APA sets the scope of review in § 706.99 Section 706(2) involves
the scope of review for questions of law, which include claims as to the
meaning of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.100 The APA
provides that courts must set aside agency action that “is not in accordance
with the law,” or that is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, short of statutory right.”101 The Supreme Court established the
landmark two-step test for the judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.102 The
first step requires determining whether the statutory language being
interpreted is ambiguous, or whether the meaning of the provision is clear
using traditional tools of statutory construction.103 If the meaning of the
provision is clear, that is the end of the matter, and the court announces
the clear meaning of the statute.104 If, however, the meaning of the
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
See id. at 77,429.
WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 271 (4th ed. 2012).
100. Id.
101. § 706(2)(A), (C); FUNK & SEAMON, supra note 99, at 272.
102. See 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
103. Id. at 842–43.
104. Id.
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provision is unclear, the court moves to the second step, which requires
the court to determine whether the agency’s construction is based on a
reasonable interpretation of the statute.105 If the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable or permissible, the court upholds the agency’s interpretation,
even if the court does not believe it is the best interpretation.106
In Chevron, the Supreme Court found the EPA’s broad definition of
source to be a permissible construction of a statute seeking to promote
reduction of air pollution.107 The EPA cited to its varied interpretation of
source to demonstrate its consistent and flexible reading of the term over
time.108 The Court found that the court of appeal’s inflexible reading and
holding that the EPA had not interpreted the statute permissibly was a
basic legal error.109
A. Chevron Step 1: Whether the Clean Air Act is Ambiguous with
Respect to “Inadequate Domestic Supply”
The first step of Chevron requires the court to determine whether the
statute under which the agency is acting is unambiguous or silent on the
issue in question.110 The test is whether there is ambiguity with regard to
the “precise question at issue.”111 Thus, the question here is whether
Congress, when granting the EPA waiver authority in the case of
inadequate domestic supply intended to allow for consideration of the
blendwall constraints.
There are four versions of Chevron step one.112 Under “original”
Chevron, the case would be decided in step one only if Congress has
explicitly answered the exact question at issue in the case.113 Using
“traditional tools” Chevron, the reviewing court employs all of the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation to find clear congressional
intent.114 Operating under “plain meaning” Chevron, the court finds clear
congressional intent using the plain meaning rule, which provides that if
the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the
statute in order to ascertain the statute’s meaning.115 Finally, under
105. Id.
106. FUNK & SEAMON, supra note 99, at 275.
107. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
108. Id. at 856.
109. JACK M. BEERMANN, INSIDE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND
WHY 128 (2011).
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
111. Id.
112. BEERMANN, supra note 109, at 130–31.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 130.
115. Id.
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“extraordinary cases” Chevron, the reviewing court finds clear
congressional intent based on an examination of the history and political
context of the particular issue, which it finds leads to only one possible
congressional intent.116
This Comment applies the “traditional tools” version of Chevron step
one to the EPA’s interpretation of inadequate domestic supply. Under this
less deferential standard, courts are more likely to find congressional intent
on a matter and are thus more likely to reverse the agency’s interpretation.
This Comment attempts to ascertain Congress’s intent using tools
including: language, structure, purpose, legislative history, and canons of
construction.117 Additionally, since Chevron, judges have looked beyond
legislative history to the common usage,118 dictionary definition,119 and
technical meaning120 of contested statutory language, as well as to
traditional canons of statutory interpretation.121 Courts have also
interpreted enabling acts in light of other legislation, “particularly where
Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at
hand.”122 Most strikingly, courts have also considered the economic and
political magnitude of the agency action at issue.123
1. Statutory Text
Courts begin analysis of statutory construction by examining the
written text and determining whether the particular provision is—in
isolation—ambiguous.124 Courts generally assume that the words of a
statute mean what an “ordinary” and “reasonable” person would
understand them to mean.125 In regard to inadequate domestic supply, the
term domestic unambiguously refers to the supply existing within U.S.
borders, as domestic is understood to mean “of, relating to, or involving
one’s own country.”126 In addition, various provisions of the RFS refer to
the amount of renewable fuel in the U.S.127 While many terms in the

116. Id. at 131.
117. Id. at 130.
118. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., WILLIAM S. JORDAN III & RICHARD W. MURPHY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL 1071 (6th ed. 2010).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1068.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1070.
125. Id.
126. Domestic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009).
127. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7545.
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provisions are clear, there is sufficient lack of clarity concerning both
inadequate and supply.
a. Supply
The EPA claims in its Final Rule that inadequate domestic supply is
ambiguous.128 It then asserts that the common understanding of the term
supply is “an amount of a resource or product that is available for use by the
person or place at issue.”129 Adopting a broad definition, the EPA’s concept
of supply encompasses not only what is produced, but also what is sold and
subsequently used by consumers. Opponents of the reduced RFS mandates
oppose the EPA’s broad reading, insisting instead that the EPA’s insertion
of consumer demand into a supply analysis is illogical, and is thus an
overreach of its constitutional authority. These opponents urge that supply,
in the context of the RFS, denotes the “volume of renewable fuel that can
be produced or imported.”130 They effectively rely on language that confines
the RFS compliance provisions to “ . . . refineries, blenders, distributors, and
importers.”131 This list of “obligated parties” does not include end
consumers.132 Further, this narrow definition precludes the EPA’s
consideration of the blendwall constraints and limits its focus to the nation’s
capacity to physically produce renewable fuel.
Legal sources define supply as “the amount of goods produced or
available at a given price.”133 Under this definition, determination of the
“amount . . . available to be purchased”134 necessarily includes consideration
of factors affecting the ability to sell the product. In this case, in order for
renewable fuel to be available for purchase, it would have to be made
available to consumers at the pump. This would require acknowledgement
of distribution constraints, as without infrastructure suitable for the housing
and dispensing of higher ethanol-blended fuel, it is impossible for
consumers to purchase it.
The EPA argues that the isolated statute appears ambiguous in
reference to the inadequate supply of which product triggers the EPA’s
general waiver authority. The EPA notes that it is unclear whether the
“available renewable fuel” definition encompasses neat renewable fuel135
128. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the BiomassBased Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,435 (Dec. 14, 2015).
129. Id.
130. Podkul, supra note 88.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Supply, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
134. Id.
135. Neat renewable fuel is a renewable fuel to which 1% or less of gasoline
fuel has been added. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1401 (2016).
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or whether it also includes the renewable fuel blended with transportation
fuel. If construed narrowly to apply only to neat renewable fuel, the EPA
has no authority to consider blendwall and distribution constraints.
Conversely, should a court determine that ambiguity lends itself in favor
of EPA discretion, the fuel supply in question will encompass blended
fuels and will ultimately permit the incorporation of the infrastructural
constraints addressed in the EPA’s Final Rule.
In this regard, the EPA is mistaken. The inadequate domestic supply in
question refers undoubtedly to renewable fuel—the antecedent for supply in
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(ii) in the “renewable fuel required under paragraph
(2),” which immediately precedes sections (i) and (ii).136 “Paragraph (2)”
refers to § 7545(o)(2), which specifies the “applicable volume of renewable
fuel.”137 As further explained infra, this clearly refers to the renewable fuel
available for purchase by obligated parties, not finished fuels that contain a
specified fraction of renewable fuels, which are distributed to end consumers.
Subparagraph (o)(2)(A) directed the EPA to promulgate regulations to
“ensure that transportation fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the
United States . . . on an annual average basis, contains at least the applicable
volume of renewable fuel . . . determined in accordance with subparagraph
(B)[.]”138 Subparagraph B of paragraph (o)(2) contains tables that provide the
statutory volume requirements for the four categories of renewable fuel: total
renewable fuel, advanced biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and biomass-based
diesel.
b. Inadequate
Even if the court were to interpret supply narrowly to exclude the
blendwall constraints, the EPA can and should argue that the term
inadequate is also ambiguous. Depending on which dictionary you
consult, inadequate is subject to a number of reasonable definitions.
Inadequate can be commonly defined as “inept or unsuitable.”139
Under this definition, inadequate supply would be construed to mean that
the supply is unsuitable in relation to another factor. As demand and
supply for a given source are intimately linked, an enormous supply in
relation to a dwindling demand may deem a supply unsuitable for that
demand. This definition lends itself in favor of the EPA’s interpretation,
which provides:

136. See § 7545(o)(7)(A).
137. Id. § 7545(o)(2).
138. Id. § (o)(2)(A)(i).
139. Inadequate, DICTIONARY.COM, dictionary.reference.com/browse/inadequate
[https://perma.cc/7YA7-PVX2] (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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Adequacy of the supply would logically be understood in terms of
the parties who use the supply of renewable qualifying fuels.
Adequacy of supply could affect various parties, including
obligated parties, blenders, and consumers. Adequacy of the
renewable fuel supply with respect to the consumer might well
involve consideration of factors different from those involved
when considering adequacy of the upstream supply of biofuels to
the obligated parties.140
Opponents may argue that inadequate is defined as “not enough” or
insufficient.141 If a court were to construe supply to indicate the amount
produced, this definition would lend itself to an interpretation consistent
with that of biofuel proponents. In this context, if the amount produced
satisfies the statutory volumes, the EPA would have no authority to
interpret its general waiver authority as it has in its Final Rule.
2. Other Factors to Consider
Though inadequate domestic supply appears ambiguous when read in
isolation, a reviewing court employing a “statutory tools” Chevron step
one analysis will consider materials beyond the specific text to determine
the proper meaning of a statutory provision.142 In fact, reasonable statutory
interpretation by an agency must account for both the specific context in
which language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole.143
Agency interpretation that is inconsistent with the design and structure of
the statute as a whole does not merit deference.144 Further, Chevron itself
considered not only the language of the statute, but also the legislative
history and policy arguments regarding the provision in question.145
a. Legislative History and Congressional Intent
The legislative history is limited as to whether Congress intended
inadequate domestic supply to encompass the blendwall constraints.
However, it is likely that legal challenges to the 2014–2016 standard
140. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the BiomassBased Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,436 (Dec. 14, 2015).
141. Inadequate, C AMBRIDGE D ICTIONARY , dictionary.cambridge.org/us
/dictionary/english/inadequate [https://perma.cc/EU57-DJWS] (last visited Apr. 9,
2017).
142. KOCH, JORDAN & MURPHY, supra note 118, at 1076.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862–
67 (1984).
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reductions will shift focus on a two-word phrase removed from the 2005
law that established the RFS. Congress declined to pass a bill providing
for express consideration of “distribution capacity” in the general waiver
provisions of the RFS.146 This refusal is significant as it raises questions
regarding the reason Congress chose to exclude the language. There is no
legislative history explaining why Congress enacted the language in lieu
of the alternative formation. On one hand, Congress may have found the
phrase “inadequate domestic supply” sufficiently broad to cover
distribution capacity, thus striking the phrase as superfluous and
unnecessary. Further, Congress may have deemed the language too
narrow, as it suggested that constraints on delivering fuel to the ultimate
consumer—other than “distribution capacity”—should not be considered
for purposes of enacting a general waiver. Under these theories, Congress
found “inadequate supply” sufficient to cover all aspects of supply, in
terms of both production of and capacity to sell and consume it.
However, while not dispositive, legislative history “strongly militates
against a judgment that Congress intended as a result that it expressly
declined to act.”147 The Supreme Court has confirmed that “[w]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another, it is presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”148 Under this presumption, and as
noted by advocates of the biofuels industry, if Congress meant to include
“capacity to supply” in addition to or as opposed to “supply,” it would
have done so.
b. Neighboring Statutory Provisions
The remainder of the statutory scheme often clarifies a provision that
seems ambiguous in isolation—only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.149
Further, there are many fuel-related provisions of the Clean Air Act with
waiver provisions similar to that found in the RFS. The EPA claims that
these statutes emphasize both the ambiguity of the RFS general waiver
provision and the reasonableness of applying it broadly to include
146. See, e.g., H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005) (citing to § 1501(a)(2)).
147. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974); see also Doe
v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622–23 (2004) (Privacy Act does not authorize presumed
damages because “Congress cut out the very language in the bill that would have
authorized any presumed damages.”).
148. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (2013) (quoting Bates v. United
States, 522 U.S. 23, 29–30 (1997)).
149. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (citing United Sav. Ass’n of
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
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adequacy of supply to the ultimate consumer of transportation fuel.150
However, when looking at Congressional word choice, these statutes
demonstrate that Congress intended for the EPA to consider distribution
capacity in addition to supply, since it says so expressly.
i. Section 211(c)(4)(C)(ii)
Section 211(c)(4)(C)(ii) of the Clean Air Act provides the EPA with
waiver authority to address “extreme and unusual fuel or fuel additive
supply circumstances . . . which prevent the distribution of an adequate
supply of fuel or fuel additive to consumers.”151 Here, Congress indicates
that the adequacy of supply is related to the availability of fuel or fuel
additive to the ultimate consumer. The statutory language expressly grants
the EPA authority to consider distribution constraints.
Unlike § 211(c)(4)(C)(ii), the RFS general waiver provision does not
contain such clarity. Though the EPA argues that the broad and ambiguous
wording provides discretionary power to interpret the scope of its waiver
authority as “relating to [the] supply of renewable fuel [in neat or blended
form] to the ultimate consumer,”152 one must question why Congress
deleted the statutory language from earlier bill drafts.
ii. Section 211(m)(3)(c)
Section 211(m)(3)(c) of the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to delay the
effective date of oxygenated gasoline requirements for certain carbon
monoxide nonattainment areas if it finds “inadequate domestic supply of,
or distribution capacity for, oxygenated gasoline . . . or fuel additives”
needed to make oxygenated gasoline.153 The linguistic choice hints that
“inadequate domestic supply” should be read as more limited in scope, in
particular to exclude consideration of distribution capacity.
The RFS uses inadequate domestic supply without the further
clarification of § 211(m)(3)(c). On one hand, this may indicate that
Congress provides the EPA discretion to determine the adequacy of the
supply of renewable fuel in terms of availability for use by the ultimate
consumer, including consideration of capacity to distribute the product to
the ultimate consumer. More likely, however, Congress’s deliberate
exclusion of “distribution capacity” from the RFS general waiver

150. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the BiomassBased Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,437–438 (Dec. 14, 2015).
151. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(C)(ii)(I).
152. 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,437.
153. See § 7545(m)(3)(C)(i).
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provision strongly lends itself to a narrow interpretation of “inadequate
domestic supply”—one that excludes distribution constraints.
3. Determining Whether “Inadequate Domestic Supply” is
Ambiguous under “Tools of Construction” Chevron Step One
A statute cannot be interpreted to grant power beyond its text unless it
is done to effectuate the statute’s purpose.154 Congress promulgated the
RFS to decrease American dependence on foreign oil sources and to
combat rising global temperatures. This requires that an increased amount
of renewable fuel be produced. Though the legislative history is scant,
when analyzing the RFS provisions in concert with neighboring provisions
of the Clean Air Act, it appears that Congress intentionally struck the
language relating to distribution capacity because it did not intend for the
EPA to consider it when waiving the RFS statutory levels. As such, the
statutory language read in context of the Clean Air Act clearly prohibits
the EPA from waiving or reducing statutory volumes to address
distribution constraints.155 A court should find this statute to clearly refer
to inadequate domestic supply in its narrowest sense.
B. Chevron Step Two: Determining Whether the EPA’s Interpretation is
Reasonable
If a court finds inadequate domestic supply to be ambiguous, the EPA
must then demonstrate that its interpretation of this phrase is rational. The
Chevron Step Two analysis requires the court to determine whether the
EPA’s construction is based on a reasonable or permissible interpretation
of the statute.156
Chevron provides that an agency interpretation should be upheld
unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.”157 In
other words, a court must uphold agency action if there is a rational basis
for it.158 While this determination appears simple at first blush, defining
precisely what constitutes a reasonable or permissible construction of a
statute, or what materials a court is required to consider in making that
determination, is often difficult. Further, there is confusion over whether
Chevron Step Two pertains to the reasonableness of an agency’s
interpretation as a matter of the meaning of the statute’s language or is
more about the reasonableness of the agency’s policy decision and
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

KOCH, JORDAN & MURPHY, supra note 118, at 1076.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
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judgment to adopt the particular meaning.159 Thus, the most important
function of “arbitrary and capricious review” is its application to questions
of judgment.160 The Supreme Court currently uses the “rational
relationship test,”161 a highly deferential assessment that deems laws
unconstitutional only if there is no possible rational basis to further a
legitimate governmental interest.162
The leading application of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of
review is found in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State
Farm Mutual,163 which involved a challenge to a decision by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) to rescind a rule in
which the agency had required every automaker to include, in every car
marketed in the U.S. after a specified date, one of two safety devices—air
bags or automatic seatbelts.164 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision holding the NHSTA’s action arbitrary and capricious, wrote what
has become the standard paragraph describing “arbitrary and capricious
review”:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relief on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.165
The Supreme Court has applied the State Farm test to several agency
rulemakings. Taken together, these cases illustrate: (1) the Court remains
committed to the test announced in State Farm—a decision is arbitrary
and capricious unless an agency engaged in a reasoned decision-making
process; (2) the State Farm test is extremely malleable; and (3) the
question whether an agency engaged in a reasoned decision-making within
the meaning of State Farm is often identical to the question courts consider
under Chevron Step Two—whether an agency’s construction of an
ambiguous provision in an agency-administered statute is reasonable.
Because these standards appear to be similarly construed, this Comment
analyzes Chevron Step Two in light of the State Farm factors.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra Part V.A.2.b.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
See supra Part V.A.2.b.
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 43.
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1. Whether the EPA Considered Factors Congress Did Not Identify
The Supreme Court announced in State Farm: “[N]ormally, an agency
rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress had not intended it to consider . . . .”166 This statement can
be interpreted in two ways: (1) to prohibit an agency from considering a
factor unless Congress specifically instructed it to do so; or (2) to prohibit
an agency from considering a factor only if Congress specifically
prohibited it from doing so. The second alternative should be adopted
because Congress’s plain intent is to allow an agency to attempt to further
a list of societal goals that is far too long to incorporate into any statute.167
Further, a key prong of arbitrariness review is an examination of the
number and nature of “relevant factors” considered by an agency in
reaching its policy decision.168 There are two contexts in which this
analysis takes place. The first occurs when the relevant factors are
provided by statute, and requires the reviewing court to ask whether the
factors actually relied upon by the agency comport with those in the
statute.169 The second involves congressional silence regarding the
relevant factors and asks whether an agency’s own choices regarding
which factors to consider satisfy the review.170
The present case involves the second scenario, as Congress appears
silent with regard to what factors the EPA is to consider when determining
whether to apply its waiver authority. However, though Congress is silent
with regard to the waiver provision itself, examination of congressional
intent behind EISA and other RFS statutes sheds some light on the issue.
It demonstrates that Congress’s active choice to excise particular language
from the general waiver provision demonstrates intent to limit the factors
the EPA can consider when exercising its waiver authority. Further, it
appears that the EPA stepped beyond the bounds of its authority by
considering factors Congress has implicitly prohibited.
The EPA notes a number of factors it considered when formulating
the final volumes for 2014–2016. These include, but are not limited to:
limitations on supply of cellulosic biofuel; insufficient supply of other
advanced biofuel to offset the shortfall in cellulosic biofuel; and practical
and legal constraints on the ability of the market to supply renewable fuels

166. Id.
167. J. MASRHAW & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 214–15
(1990).
168. Louis J. Virelli III, Destructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C.
L. REV. 721, 753 (2014).
169. Id. at 754.
170. Id. at 754–55.
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to the vehicles that can use them.171 While the first two factors clearly
implicate the supply of renewable fuels, the third factor appears to blur the
line between supply and distribution of supply. Congress does not
specifically enumerate factors that the EPA must consider when
determining whether there is a supply inadequate enough to trigger the
EPA’s waiver authority; however, reading this provision in light of
neighboring statutes and EISA language lends to a narrower interpretation
of both supply and to the appropriate factors to use when determining
whether such supply is adequate.
Further, the RFS provides that the promulgated regulations for renewable
fuels, as well as the obligation itself, apply to “refineries, blenders,
distributors, and importers, as appropriate.”172 When defining the obligated
parties, Congress does not mention consumers. Again, an active exclusion of
the word “consumers” from the obligated party definition evidences
congressional intent to limit the application of the RFS to those responsible
for producing the renewable fuel, not to expand it to consumer use.
2. Whether the EPA Failed to Consider an Important Aspect of the
Problem
The EPA’s reduction of the statutory volumes will undermine
certainty and predictability for investors and other biofuel market
participants.173 This will undoubtedly lead to negative environmental and
economic consequences that run contrary to Congress’s legislative
purposes in enacting the statute.174
The underlying reality is that market pressures drive innovation;
however, there is no way markets can assess the value of avoiding
“catastrophic climate change, or for the benefit of disentangling
[themselves] from the geopolitical and national security concerns that
come along with serious dependence on the oil market.”175 Though the
goals of decreasing dependence on the oil market are worth pursuing, the
171. See Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,426 (Dec. 14,
2015).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
173. Jim Lane, Industry’s Withering Critique of EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard
Proposals for 2014, 2015, 2016: The Digested Version, BIOFUELS DIGEST (July 19,
2015), biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2015/07/29/industrys-withering-critique-of-epasrenewable-fuel-standard-proposals-for-2014-2015-2016-the-digested-version/ [https:
//perma.cc/V63R-S8DL].
174. Id.
175. Jeff Spross, Why the EPA Cut Down the Biofuel Standard for the First Time
Ever, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 18, 2013, 12:26 PM), thinkprogress.org/climate/2013
/11/18/2956771/epa-cut-biofuel-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/8H7C-7GEA].
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market will not achieve them if left to its own devices. Oil refiners, car
companies, and station supply chains have no inherent motivation to see
how far they can push the technology for higher blends. Moreover, like all
businesses, refiners, car companies, and supply chains are hesitant to take
on the added costs and risks of accommodating higher renewable fuel
blends without concrete incentive.176 For this reason, the pressure to drive
this necessary innovation must come from the government. This means
that the RFS must be implemented in its intended form.
Bob Dinneen claimed “the minute you introduce blending capacity or
blendwall considerations into a decision as to whether or not to waive the
problem is the minute you take the nation’s renewable fuel policy away
from the statute and put it in the hands of oil companies.”177
The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the American
Automobile Manufacturers insist that the EPA is pushing E15 too hard and
too quickly.178 Service stations also struggle with the costs and practical
challenges of updating their equipment to take E15 blends and higher.179
While this is the practical reality, oil companies are to blame. These
companies structure their contracts with service stations to hold down the
sale of higher blends, and to prevent advertising. If the oil companies were
so concerned with surplus ethanol, they would make it much easier for
service stations to sell higher blends.180 Most importantly, this would
involve the willingness to implement the infrastructure designed to blend,
distribute, and dispense renewable fuels.
It is not that the EPA failed to consider the impact of its statutory
reduction on American innovators; it is that it failed to consider the
magnitude of that impact. By giving in to notions of the blendwall, the
EPA is effectively handing the future of the biofuels industry to the oil
companies.
3. Whether the EPA Offered an Explanation for its Decision that
Runs Counter to the Evidence Before It
This element, known as the “rational connection” factor, serves as an
important check on potentially irrational administrative conduct that goes
to the very heart of the justifications of the administrative state. Its
deferential approach fosters agency expertise and efficiency, while at the

176.
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same time guarding against administration that is so irrational as to betray
its democratic pedigree.181
In agency decisions involving scientific or technical information, an
issue arises as to whether an agency had processes to ensure the reliability
or veracity of information inputs to its policy decisions.182 Reliable inputs
provide substantive information relevant to policymakers and create a
rational basis from which administrators may justify their policy
determinations.183 The process for exclusion of unreliable information is
even more important, as unreliable information could cause agencies to
make poorly informed decisions, “manufacture uncertainty,” or otherwise
mischaracterize those inputs in support of a policy decision that is not in
fact supported by data.184
It appears that the EPA has placed too much reliance on the
distribution problems professed by retailers. The oil industry has declared
that there is no role for any ethanol beyond E10, or for the RFS at all.185
However, they clearly have a vested interest in distracting the legislature
from looking at E85, and will stop at nothing to keep the debate focused
on the limitations of E10. The corn ethanol lobby would like to pretend
that the infrastructural constraints are not real, and have been entirely
manufactured by the oil industry. While the infrastructural challenges of
the blendwall are real, they are more like speed bumps, which require
slowing down—not stopping.
4. Whether the EPA’s Interpretation is So Implausible that it Could
Not Be Ascribed to a Difference in View of the Product of Agency
Expertise
Although the EPA’s Acting Assistant Administrator of the Office of
Air and Radiation provided that the lowered standards established a “path
for ambitious, responsible growth in biofuels,” the EPA’s decision to
lower the 2014–2016 statutory levels set by Congress is neither ambitious

181. Virelli, supra note 168, at 758.
182. Id. at 745.
183. Id.
184. Id. Factors include: slower expected development of the cellulosic biofuel
industry, less growth in gasoline use than expected when Congress enacted the
provisions in 2007, constraints in supplying biofuels to consumers, a limited
number and geographic distribution of retail stations that offer higher ethanol
blends, and decrease in total gasoline consumption. See, e.g., Final Renewable
Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the Biomass-Based Diesel Volume
for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,422, 432, 433 (Dec. 14, 2015).
185. See Spross, supra note 175.
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nor responsible.186 It makes little sense that in promulgating a mandate for
the commercialization of biofuels, which implies a mandate that they be
consumed, Congress intended to grant the EPA authority to waive that
mandate in light of consumption constraints. In fact, these constraints were
likely part of the original impetus for the mandate. It seems much more
plausible that Congress intended for its mandate to be waived in the event
that there is sufficient production of domestic biofuels to satisfy it.187 In
the end, the RFS program was designed to force the oil industry to change
the statute quo, not to perpetuate it. The entire purpose of the program
would be subverted if the oil industry is rewarded for its failure to take the
steps necessary to ensure that it is capable of distributing, blending, and
dispensing the renewable fuel volumes required by the statute.188
CONCLUSION
While courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutes that they
are charged with implementing, this deference is not without limits.189 The
EPA’s proffered interpretation is not consistent with the text, structure, or
purposes of the statute, and is unreasonable.190 Moreover, the EPA’s
interpretation is directed in significant part to accommodating the
economic interests of parties who are obligated to comply with the
statutory renewable volume obligations, which is not a permissible basis
for waiving or ignoring the requirements of the statute.191 With all due
respect to the EPA, the Agency’s proposed interpretation of “inadequate
domestic supply” amounts to a rhetorical sleight of hand.192 Supply is not
demand. The EPA appears to have acted contrary to congressional intent
by considering blendwall constraints to trigger its general waiver
authority. However, even if a court were to construe the statutory language
broadly to find it ambiguous and give the EPA discretion to consider the
blendwall factors, the EPA’s decision will not satisfy the four-factor test
set forth in State Farm, or the Chevron’s Step Two. Not only does the EPA
186. Re-examining EPA’s Management of the Renewable Fuel Standard
Program: Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs & Fed. Mgmt., Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov. Affairs, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of Janet McCabe,
Assistant Adm’r., Office of Air & Radiation, EPA).
187. Slating & Kesan, supra note 17, at 435.
188. See id.
189. See Letter from Brian Jennings, Exec. Vice President, Am. Coal. for Ethanol,
to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA (July 27, 2015), ethanol.org/news/news/2015/07/27
/aces-comments-to-the-epa-on-the-proposed-rfs-for-2015-and-2016/ [https://perma
.cc/4Y4J-4M9T].
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
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appear to consider factors expressly unintended by Congress, as evidenced
by the excision of language pertaining to “distribution capacity,” it also fails
to consider a serious and evident impact of the statutory reduction. By
adopting the oil companies’ narratives regarding the ability of the market to
effectively distribute increasing volumes of renewable fuels, rather than
putting the RFS back on track, the EPA has created its own slower, costlier,
and ultimately diminished track for renewable fuels in the U.S.
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